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Abstract
We used 20 independently developed but functionally equivalent software versions to investigate
and compare empirically some properties of N-version programming, Recovery Block and
Consensus Recovery Block using the majority and consensus voting algorithms. We have also
compared this with another hybrid fault-tolerant scheme called Acceptance Voting using dynamic
versions of consensus and majority voting.
Consensus voting provides adaptation of the voting strategy to varying component reliability, failure
correlation, and output space characteristics. Since failure correlation among versions effectively
reduces the cardinality of the space in which voters make decisions, consensus voting is usually
preferable to simple majority voting in any fault-tolerant system.
When versions have considerably different reliabilities, the version with the best reliability will
perform better than any of the fault-tolerant techniques. Consensus Recovery Block produces the
highest reliability most of the time. It outperforms N-version programming, but also very
successfully competes with Recovery Block in situations where the acceptance test is not of the
highest quality. Consensus Recovery Block is surprisingly robust even in the presence of failure
correlation.. Acceptance voting is, under special circumstances, more reliable than both Consensus
Recovery Block and Recovery Block. It, in general, has lower reliability than the others.
*Research supported in part by NASA Grant No. NAG- 1-983
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1. Introduction
1.1 N-Version Programming and Recovery Block
In many fault-tolerant software systems, redundancy is used to provide the fault-tolerance. Several
independently developed but functionally equivalent (IDFE) software versions are combined in
various ways in an attempt to increase reliability and safety.
One of the earliest fault-tolerant systems (FTS) was Recovery Block (RB) [e.g., Ran75] in
which IDFE versions are executed in sequence and the output passed to an acceptance test (AT). If
the output of the first version fails the acceptance test, then the second or backup software version is
executed and its output checked by the AT, etc. In the case that the outputs of all versions are rejected
the system fails. A problem with this strategy is the sequential nature of the execution of versions
and finding a simple and highly reliable acceptance test which does not involve the development of
an additional software version. As a result, other FTS strategies such as N-version
Programming (NVP) [e.g., Avi77, Avi85] were proposed where all IDFE versions are executed
in parallel and their outputs adjudicated by a voter. A problem with strategies based on voting is that
situations can _ where there is an insufficient number of agreeing versions and voting fails simply
because the voter cannot make a decision. In the following sections we will investigate empirically
several alternative voting strategies for these and other fault-tolerant schemes. Two hybrid
fault-tolerant software methods which combine RB and NVP are examined.
L ' V_,rslon: lJ_
(x . _ _" correct result
wrong result _ f 1--o_
csnnot decide
J _ _ to .ccept:nce test)
accept _ .... ,..__._
(success: correct result ( ----Te_--t---- _
failure: wrong result) _ J
success -" I . -_.
(accept correct result) qL reject wrong result
errors
reject correct result 131
accept wrong result 132
Figure 1. The Consensus Recovery Block model.
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1.2 Consensus Recovery Block
Scot et al. [Sco87] have developed a hybrid software fault-tolerance model called Consensus
Recovery Block (CRB). The system first attempts to vote. If the voting module cannot make a
decision, the system reverts to RB. The strategy is depicted in Figure 1, where the number of
versions in the system is N, 1 - ¢x is the probability that a version gives correct result, 131 is the
probability that acceptance test _ a correct result, 132 is the probability that acceptance test
cca.q.q.¢.l_an incorrect result. In general, CRB offers system reliability superior to that provided by
NVP[Sco87, Bel90]. However, CRB, like NVP does not resolve the problem of a voter which
returns a wrong answer because several versions produce identical-and-wrong answers or there is
not a majority as might be the case when there are multiple correct outputs.
1.3 Acceptance Voting
A hybrid fault-tolerant method we call Acceptance Voting (AV) was first described in [Ath89]
The method is also described in [Be190]. Athavale [Ath89] developed the model specifically as a
solution in some situations where CRB may have problems, e.g. small output spaces. [Bel90]
proposes the method as a possible solution for poor acceptance tests. We are more interested in the
former since the performance of some more reliable hybrid models such as CRB deteriorates when
the output space is small. A binary output space is an extreme case where CRB acts as a simple
voter, and the acceptance test is never invoked. One way of treating this problem is to reduce, or
completely eliminate, as many wrong answers as possible before voting. This, however, reduces
the voter decision space.
I Version J
correct result J k wrong result
pt a _ reject
success fa ilu re
Figure 2. Block diagram of Acceptance Voting
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The model of the AV scheme is shown in Figure 2. As in NVP and RB, N IDFE versions are
developed, together with an acceptance test, and a voting procedure. When AV is invoked, all
versions execute and submit their outputs for acceptance testing. Only the outputs that pass the
acceptance test continue on to the voter. Each time the model is invoked it may vote with a different
number of outputs, depending on how many results were passed to the voter by the AT. We will
investigate various voting schemes for handling the case when some of the versions have failed the
acceptance test.
2. Adjudication Strategies
2.1 Majority and 2-out-of-N Voting
In an m-out-of-N fault-tolerant software system the number of versions is N, and m is the agreement
number, or the number of matching outputs which the voting or adjudication algorithm requires for
system success [e.g. Tri82, Eck85]. In the past, because of cost restrictions, N was rarely larger
N+I
than 3, and m was traditionally chosen as_ for odd m. In general, in Majority Voting (MV),
FN+ll
m = ,_ i, where r ] denotes the ceillng function. Scott et al. [Sco87] showed that, if the output
space is large, and true statistical independence of version failures can be assumed, there is no need
to choose m > 2 regardless of the size of N, although larger m values offer additional benefits. We
wiU use the term 2-out-of-N Voting (2NV) for the case where agreement number m=2. In this
experiment we do not have statistical independence of version failures. Hence, we will only use this
voting technique when showing upperbounds for reliabilities of the systems we consider. In a model
based on software diversity and a voting strategy there is a difference between correctness and
agreement. McAllister et al. [McA90] distinguish between agreement and correctness and develop
and evaluate an adaptive voting strategy called Consensus Voting (CV). This strategy is
particularly effective in small output spaces because it automatically adjusts the voting to the changes
in the effective output space cardinality. They show that the MV sfirategy provides a lower bound on
the reliability provided by CV, and that a 2-out-of-N voting strategy gives an upper bound for m>2.
2.2 Consensus Voting
In Consensus Voting the voter uses the following algorithm to select the "correct" answer:.
If there is a majority agreement (m > N+I ,,
- r-_k], N>I) then this answer is chosen as the correct"
answer.
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Otherwise, if there is a unique maximum agreement, but this number of agreeing versions is less
than F_2--1, then this answer is chosen as the "correct" one.
Otherwise, if there is a de in the maximum agreement number from several output groups then
- ff CV is used in NVP one group is chosen at random and the answer associated with this
group is chosen as the "correct" one.
- else if CV is is used in CRB all groups are subjected to an acceptance test which is then used
to choose the "correct" output.
In [McAg0] it is shown that the strategy is equivalent to MV when the output space cardinality is 2,
and to the 2-out-of-N voting when the output space cardinality tends to infinity provided the
agreement number is not less than 2. It is also proved that, in general, the boundary probability
below which the system reliability begins to deteriorate as more versions are added is 1 where r is
r'
the cardinality of the output space.
=
E
2.3 Dynamic Voting
In the AV fault-tolerant scheme the mmflx, of outputs passed to the voter may vary. Voting may be
done using any suitable voting scheme. The voting agreement number may be chosen statically
(e.g. 2 of N, or majority of N) but the situation may arise where there are less outputs than the
agreement number in which case the voter cannot make a decision. A better technique is to choose
a voting algorithm which is dynamic and depends on the number of outputs passed to the voter.
We call the latter approach dynamic voting and distinguish between Dynamic Majority Voting
(DMV) and Dynamic Consensus Voting (DCV) .The difference between the DMV and MV is that
even if a small number of results are passed to the voter, dynamic voting will try to fred the
majority among them. Both Athavale [Ath89] and BeUi and ledrzejowicz [Bel90] have limited
their analytical woxk to DMV. In the following sections we also explore AV with DCV.
2.4 Coincident Failures
Most of the theory developed in [Sco87, McA90, Ath89, Bel90] was derived under the assumption
of interversion failure independence. When two or more functionally equivalent software
components fail on the same input case we say that a coincident failure has occurred. When two or
more versions give the same incorrect response, to a given tolerance, we say that an
identical-and-wrong (IAW) answer was obtained. If the measured probability of the coincident
failures is significantly different from what would be expected by random chance (using failure
independence model) then we say that the observedcoincident failures are correlated or dependent.
Experiments have shown that inter-version failure dependence among IDFE versions may not be
negligible in the context of current software development and testing strategies [e.g., Sco84a,
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Kni86]. Reliability performance of NVP in the presence of failure correlation was theoretically
investigated in [Sco84a, Sco84b, Eck85, Lit90].
In this paper we empirically examine the behavior of CRB, AV, NVP and RB models in the presence
of failure correlation. For this we use 20 IDFE programs developed in a multiversion experiment
[Ke188, Vou90]. The primary goal of this study is investigation of the properties of CV, CRB and
AV, and not of the principle of software diversity and the faults that may be associated with it. The
versions are used _ as a medium for testing the hypotheses about the above models. We will
argue that if choosing a wrong answer or having no answer has the same impact on the system, then
these models should be preferred to strategies like majority voting even in the presence of correlated
failures.
Table 1. Version failure rates.
Version
I
Failure Rate*
Estimate I Estimate II
1 0.58 0.59
2 0.07 0.07
3 0.13 0.11
4 0.07 0.06
5 0.11 0.10
6 0.63 0.64
7 0.07 0.06
8 0.35 0.36
9 O.40 O.39
10 0.004 0.000
11 0.09 O. 10
12 0.58 0.59
13 0.12 0.12
14 0.37 0.38
15 0.58 0.59
16 0.58 0.59
17 0.10 0.09
18 0.004 0.006
19 0.58 0.59
20 0.34 O.33
I
(*) Ba_w.Aon the 3 "best.acceleration" variables. Each column was
obtained on the basis of • separate set of 500 random cases.
3. Empirical Results
3.1 Experimental Environment
The 20 software versions we used are described in [Ke188] and [Vou90]. The versions and execution
profiles were known to result in relatively high intensity correlated program failures. In fact, we
used the program versions before they underwent the so called "certification testing" phase of the
above experiment in order to retain the mix of faults present immediately after unit development
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phase. To investigate empirically the properties of different FFS models we needed subsets of
versions with properties such as: 1) similar average 1 N-tuple reliability (where N is the number of
versions assumed to be involved in decision making), 2) a range of average N-tuple reliabilifies, and
3) a range of voter decision space cardinalities. In this paper we report on the behavior of 3, 5 and 7
version systems formed from the pool of 20 versions. The subset selection process is described in
Appendix I.
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Figure 3. Example of a joint coincident failure profile.
m
The test set profile, the choice of output variables involved in the voting, and the number and the
choice of versions all influence the mix and intensity of observed failures. In conducting our
experiments we considered a number of input profiles and different combinations of versions and
output variables. Failure rate estimates based on the three most critical output variables (out of 63
monitored) are shown in Table 1. Two test suites each containing 500 uniform random input test
cases were used in all estimates discussed in this paper. One suite was used to obtain estimates of
individual version failure rates, N-tuple reliabilities, select sample N-tuple combinations, and
compute expected "independent model" response. The other was used to investigate the behavior of
the voting and fault-tolerance strategies. The sample size is sufficient for the version and N-tuple
1 Estimated average N-tuple reliability = _ =
where _ is estimated reliability of version i.
ri=l _, sample stand, dev. estimate = O =
i=l N-1 '
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reliability ranges on which we report here 2. Acceptance test used in tlB, AV and CRB studies was
one of the 20 versions not in the subset from which N-tuples were drawn. This provided possible
correlation not only among versions, but also between the acceptance test and the versions. The FTS
algorithms of interest were invoked for each test case. The outcome was compared to the correct
answer obtained from a "golden" program [Ke188, Voug0] and the frequency of successes and
failures for each slxategy was recorded.
The failure correlation properties of the version sets can be deduced from their joint coincident failure
prof'des, and the corresponding identical-and-wrong response prof'des. Figure 3 shows the prof'de
for a 17 version system (three versions selected to act as acceptance tests are not in the set). The
abscissa represents the number of versions that fail coincidentally, and the ordinate is the frequency
of the event over the 500 test suite samples. Also shown is the expected frequency prof'de
corresponding to the independent "binomial" model [Tri82, Vou85]. The deviation from the
"expected" prof'fle is obvious. Table 2 summarizes the corresponding empirical frequency of
coincident identical-and-wrong responses. For example, in 500 tries there were 15 events where 8
versions coincidentally returned an answer which was wrong yet identical within the tolerance used
to compare the three most critical (real) variables. Both, Figure 3 and Table 2 are strong indicators of
a high degree of inter-version failure dependence.
Table 2. Frequency of empirical coincident identical-and-wrong fLAW) events over 500 test cases
for the set of 17 versions shown in Figure 3. The span is the number of versions that coincidentaUy
returned a IAW answer.
The Span of IAW Events
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Frequency
2049 164 1 16 1 1 2 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
We study how different FTS models behave in this environment. We investigated NVP with MV
(NVP-MV), and NVP with C'V (NVP-CV). We also considered RB, CRB with MV (CRB-MV),
CRB with CV (CRB-CV), and AV. With Acceptance Voting we used Dynamic Majority Voting
(AV-DMV) and Dynamic Consensus Voting (AV-DC'V).
3.2 Consensus Voting
2A investigation using higher reliability versions and up to 100,000 test cases is in progress.
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Table 3 gives examples of the detailed behavior of selected individual N-tuples. In the table we
show the count of the number of times the best version in an N-tuple was correct (Best Version),
and the success frequency of each of the above fault-tolerant strategies. The best response is
underlined with a full line, while the second best with a wavy line. Also shown in the table is the
breakdown of the NVP-CV decision process by the frequency of sub-events that yielded the
consensus decision. We recorded the number of times consensus was a successful majority
(S-Majority), an unsuccessful majority (F-Majority), a successful plurality (S-Plurality) which
corresponds to the situation where there is a unique maximum of identical outputs but that
maximum is not a majority, an unsuccessful plurality (F-Plurality), a successful (S-Random) and
an unsuccessful (F-Random) attempt at breaking a tie by random selection, and a failure by fiat
(F-Fiat) by which we mean a situation where a tie existed but all the groups of outputs involved
contained wrong answers so any choice made to break the tie led to failure. The sum of
S-Majority, S-Plurality and S-Random comprises consensus voting success total, while the sum of
F-Majority, F-Plurality, F-Random and F-Fiat is equal to the total number of cases where voting
failed (F-Total).
The maximum voter decision space for a single test case is N. The table shows the average
conditional voter decision space (CD-space) which is defined as the average size of the space in
which the voter makes the decisions given that at least one of the versions has failed. We use
CD-space to focus on the behavior of the voters when failures are present.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the relationship between NVP-CV and NVP-MV success over a range of
average N-tuple reliabilities for 3-version and 7-version systems respectively. The "ragged" look of
the experimental traces is partly due to the small sample (500 test cases), but also due to the presence
of very highly correlated failures. The experimental behavior is in good agreement with the trends
indicated by the theoretical CV model based on failure independence [McA90]. For instance, we see
that for N=3, NVP has difficulty competing with the best version when the average N-tuple
reliability is low. This is because the selected low average reliability N-tuples are composed of
versions which are not "balanced", i.e. their reliabilities are very different. As average N-tuple
reliability increases (and N-tuples become more balanced) NVI' performance approaches, or exceeds,
that of the best version. We also see that larger N improves performance of CV more than it does that
of MV.
The columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show the results for two unbalanced low reliability 3-tuples, while
column 3 shows the results for a well balanced 3-tuple of higher reliability. We see that in the former
case the highest reliability is that of the best version while in the latter NVP-CV offers the best result.
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An examination of CV sub-events shows that in the case of low reliability 3-tuples most of the voting
success counts come from majority agreement. The rest of the cases result in the failure of the
NVP-MV model because all three versions return different results. However, CV attempts to salvage
the situation. For instance, for 3-tuple in column 1 CV attempted to recover 289 times by random
select/on of one of the outputs, and as would be expected it succeeded about 30% of the time. In two
cases all three answers returned by the 3-tuple were wrong and failures occurred regardless of which
strategy was employed (F-Fiat).
Table 3. Examples of the frequency of voting and recovery events.
1 2 3 4 S 6 7 O 9 10 11 12 13 14 1S 1_ 17
V_k}a8 6,10,1d; 8,5J,18
"d'-4:upl.e lj_ruc_u:e
"7,11,13 2,3,S 2,3,4 1,3,8, _I;,8 4,7,8, _,9,12 4,7,8 1,3,5 5,7,11 S,J,_ 8,9,18 3,5,_ 3,S,_ 4,5,8
'7,11, g,g, 9,'n, 10,12, 12,15 13,14 11,13 1_,20 _D,_D 11,20 11,17 12,20
14,20 13,20 15,1G g m
Av_ ReL 0.59 0.75 0._ 0._ 0.79 0.71 0.60 0.G3 0.58 0.86 0.70 0.86 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.gl 0.71
S_L Ikv. 0.35 0.21 o.a3 0._ 0.15 0.18 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.c6 0.21
ATR& 0.87 0.90 0.87 0._6 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.g0 0.9 0.996 0.996 0.90
CI)._ 2.92 2.57 2.13 2.50 2.98 3.26 5.28 4.19 4.21 2.43 2.82 2.42 2.56 2.56 2.47 2.46 2.65
SiR [_v. 0.27 0.50 0.34 0.79 1.03 1.26 1.17 1.38 0.¢_ 0.73 0.87 0.66 0.50 0.50 0._ 0.78 0.77
fUGGemJ 7Eaa'tlmGv
BmtV_n ca _ _ 467 466 _ _ 4_7 441 _ 147 _ _ _ 4_ 4_ _/_
NVP-MV 209 344 484 464 436 _ _09 285 _7 ¢_ 400 4_ 344 344 450 464 4_
NVP-CV _ _4 m _ _ 4e 449 4_s 34e 48_ _ 4_ 364 3a 4_2 4_ 4_
RB 4_ 45_ _ _ 455 m 449 454 _ ¢0 4_ 450 4_ 4_ 474 4_ 4_
CI_-MV 4_ 4¢ ¢4 4j.3_ 0__ 0!_ 449 46j _s 4_ 40 __. 465 _9 4_ 4_ _
CI_CY _I_ _ _ _ 467 4_ _4 467 46S 4_ _ 4_ _a_ 4_9 _ _
AV.MV 432 40 434 482 450 450 450 450 45._0 450 434 450 449 433 4_ 4_2 4_
AV-CV 432 458 434 482 450 _I 450 450 450 450 434 458 458 03 481 490 450
Sucosas Fxq,ausney of 07 Jub_Evmt.
S-_O_ 2_9 344 484 464 436 405 209 285 287 466 400 464 344 344 450 464 432
F-_M_y 0 34 0 15 I 0 0 0 0 015 0 34 34 0 018
_" 0 0 0 19 31 62 23_ i_ 42 16 65 20 0 0 15 19 17
F-Rgr_ 0 0 0 1 Z"/ 15 33 19 Z 16 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
S-Rmdom _ 40 5 0 e 2 2 9 19 0 0 7 40 37 7 5 5
F-l_Jom 196 82 10 1 7 16 18 7 120 2 2 8 _ _ Ii 12 12
F-I_I 2 o z o o o o o 31 o 16 1 o o 17 o _s
F-To_ z_e 116 11 17 25 31 51 25 152 18 35 9 116 119 28 12 46
m,,, ,,,
(*) Asstanlng that effecti_ error output space has
answers fr_ two or more versions.
infinite cardinality, i.e. there are no ooincldent identical and wrong
Columns 4-7 illustrate behavior of 7-tuples, and columns 8-12, and 15-17 behavior of 5-mples.
When N > 3 advantages of CV over MV increase because plurality vote is now possible. One
problem that NVP-MV does not solve are the small space situations where the vote fails because a
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOff QUALITY
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voter is offered more than two groups of answers to select the "correct" output from, but there is no
majority so voting cannot return a decision. The events are those where there is no agreement
majority but one of the outputs occurs more frequently than any other, and those where there is a tie
between the maximum number of outputs in two or more groups of outputs. For example, consider-
the 5-version system from column 8 where CV is the best overall strategy. Correct majority was
available in only 285 cases, while in 181 instances the corre_'t output was chosen by plurality, and 9
times success came by random selection.
_°1 ,.,, __ ['".., /'... 1'__ I
1 v.r.,oo j J ..... t
_ N
/ ............. i I jam. _ " NVP-MV /
" 1 ..// \ / N = 3 I.
_ooI .2 _/ .-_uo,o_ub_o,_ I
0.4 0.S 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.g 1.0
Average N-Tuple Reliabllity
Figure 4. System reliability by voting (N=3).
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(/)
200 I - _- _ _- -- e- I
0.5 0.6 0_.7 0.8 0.9
Average N-Tuple Reliability
Figure 5. System reliability by voting (N=7).
The theoretical relationship between the system output space cardinality, r, and voting strategies is
illustrated in Figure 6 for N=15. In the figure we plot the reliability of NVP-CV versus the average
reliability of a 15-version system for differem output space cardinality values. Also shown are the
NVP 2-out-of-N and NVP-MV boundary curves. It is important to note that both MV and
2-out-of-N voting are effectively output space insensitive and that 2-out-of-N is a viable strategy
only when r >> 1. CV is r sensitive and therefore will perform better than MV for r > 2. The
reliability based on MV is a lower limit on the reliability of CV, while 2-out-of-N voting reliability is
an upper limit on the reliability by CV when agreement number is m _>2.
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System
Reliability
NVP
1"0 I (2-0 rU t-:_'i'_i__/_ -& -ill- ill-ill-ill
0.9 =
0.8
/ oy0.7 r=l
0"6 t / > r=cJ/
0.5 VP- = 2
0.4
o,ll/y/.v,.v0.20.I
o.o £__'- -
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Average N-Tuple Reliability
Figure 6. System reliability under different voting strategies. The probability of each j=2,..,r
failure state is _-_. All versions in the IS-version system are assumed to have same reliability p.
Figure 7 illustrates the influence of the the average conditional voter decision space for a subset of
5-versionsystems that have an approximatelyequal reliability. Again the behavior is in good
agreement with the theoretical trends shown in Figure 6. The larger the decision space cardinality the
more reliable NVP-CV becomes over NVP-MV. In Figure 7 the maximum decision space is 5. The
other extreme is binary output space (r=-2). An answer is either correct, or incorrect and no
distinction is possible among incorrect answers. In binary output space CV reduces to NVP-MV and
cannot improve on it.
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In practice, failure probabilities of individual versions have a nonzero standard deviation about the
N-tuple mean. Small scatter may, up to a point, increase average reliability obtained by voting
because there may be enough versions on the "high" side of the mean to form a correct agreement
number more often than would be expected from a set where all versions have the same reliability.
But when the scatter is excessive the system reliability can actually be lower than the reliability of
one or more of its best component versions. This effect is illustrated in Figure 8 [McA90]. The
data were obtained by simulation based on the independent model (100,000 case runs for each
point shown). We plot the system reliability based on NVP-CV and NVP-MV against the standard
deviation of the N-tuple reliability (the mean value being constant). Also shown is the reliability of
the best single version involved in the simulation. The feature to note is the very sharp step in the
best version reliability once some critical value of the standard deviation of the sample is exceeded
(about 0.03 in this example). The same effect was observed experimentally. It can be seen in
Figures 4 and 5, and Table 3 examples, where low average reliability systems with a high standard
deviation about the average perform worse than the best version. It is better illustrated in Figure 9
where we see the reliability of 5-version systems with average reliability of about 0.85 vs. the
standard deviation of the 5 version sample.
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Figure 9. Influence of small voter decision space
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From Figure 9 we see that NVP-CV is relatively successful in providing reliability comparable to, or
better than, that of the best version so long as the dispersion around the mean is relatively small. The
very high variability in the performance of both NVP strategies is due to highly correlated failures. In
general, presence of faults resulting in correlated failures will produce an effect which is equivalent
to either a reduction, or an increase in the average output space cardinality. In situations like that a
voting strategy which can adapt to changes in the effective output space cardinality may have defmite
advantages over NVP-MV (which fails ff there is no majority).
Inspection of Table 3 and Figures 4, 5, 7 and 9 confrere that NVP-CV behaves very much like its
model based on failure independence in small output spaces predicts. For example, CV always offers
reliability at least equivalent to MV, and performs better than MV when the average decision space in
which voters work is sufficiently large.
3.3 Recovery Block and Consensus Recovery Block
Theory predicts that in an ideal situation (version failure independence, most favorable voting
strategy, perfect voter) CRB is always superior to both NVP (given the same version reliabilities and
the same voting strategy) and Recovery Block (given the same version and acceptance test
reliabilities) [Sco87]. This is illustrated in Figure 10. It is interesting to note the cross-over point
between RB and NVP caused by low reliability of the RB acceptance test.
The experimental results are illustrated in Figures 11 and 12. The number of times that the result
provided by the FTS strategy was correct is plotted against the version reliability. The same
acceptance test version was used by CRB and RB. From the figures we see that CRB-MV provides
reliability _ equal to or larger than the reliability by NVP-MV (given the same versions), and
reliability which is usually at least as good or better than that by RB. Usually CRB-CV is better than
NVP-CV, but because CRB-CV employs the acceptance test to resolve situations where there is no
plurality while NVP-CV uses random tie breaking, occasionally NVP-CV is marginally more reliable
than CRB-CV. Examples of this can be seen in columns 3, 5, and 8 or Table 3, and Figures 12 and
17. In all three tabulated cases the difference in favor of NVP-CV is exactly equal to S-Random.
The larger the number of versions (N-tuple) the better the performance of CRB when compared to
NVP (given the same voting strategy) or RB (given the same acceptance test). We observe that
NVP-CV and NVP-MV may not perform as well as RB given a sufficiently reliable acceptance test,
but CRB-CV (or CRB-MV) is generally superior (Figures 11 and 12).
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Usually CRB-CV is more reliable than CRB-MV. However, if the number of agreeing versions is
less than the majority sometimes the reverse may be true. For instance, if there is no majority then
MV will fall and pass the decision to the acceptance test (which may succeed), while CV Will vote
and if the plurality is incorrect because of identical and wrong answers CV will return an incorrect
answer. An example is given in Figure 13 and in columns 5 and 8 of Table 3.
A general observation regarding the behavior of CRB in the presence of failure correlation is that it is
surprisingly robust. Our results appear to follow the general trends predicted by theoretical models
based on failure independence.
m
3.4 Acceptance Voting
Acceptance Voting is very dependent on the reliability of the acceptance test (AT). If the AT is
sufficiently reliable, AV can sometimes perform better than RB (e.g. columns 13 and 15 in Table
3). Also, reduction in effective output space cardinality may make RB and AV superior to CRB. In
some situations AV performs better than CRB or any other voting based approaches (e.g. columns
14 and 15 in Table 3). Figures 14, 15 and 18 illustrate the theoretical behavior of AV in
comparison with other strategies given failure independence and different AT reliability (13, cf.
Figures 14 and 15) and output space cardinality (of. Figures 15 and 18). But, in general, AV
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systems will be less reliable than CRB systems. Figures 16 and 17 illustrate experimental results
for N=3 and 5 respectively.
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Figure 14. System reliability under Dynamic Majority Voting vs. version reliability assuming
infinite cardinality of the output space for N = 3, and 13= 0.1.
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Figure 19. In small voter decision spaces AV may be superior to CRB.
AV reliability performance is usually superior when there is a large probability that a CRB voter
would return a wrong answer, but at the same time the AT is sufficiently reliable so that it can
eliminate most of the incorrect responses before the voting. The theoretical behavior of AV for a
binary space using an AT with 0.8 reliability is shown in Figure 18. Figure 19 compares
experimental behavior of AV and CRB for a range of conditional voter decision space cardinalities.
We see that AV does indeed perform better than CRB-CV when voter decision space is small. Very
highly correlated failures may still make AV perform as poorly as CRB, but in general in the case of
very a small voter decision space AV tends to outperform CRB provided the AT is sufficiently
reliable.
4. Summary and Conclusions
We used 20 independently developed but functionally equivalent software versions to investigate and
compare empirically some properties of N-version programming, Recovery Block and Consensus
Recovery Block using the majority and consensus voting algorithms. We have also compared this
with another hybrid fault-tolerant scheme called Acceptance Voting using a dynamic versions of
consensus and majority voting.
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Consensus voting provides adaptation of the voting strategy to varying component reliability, failure
correlation, and output space characteristics. Since failure correlation among versions effectively
changes the cardinality of the space in which voters make decisions, consensus voting is usually
preferable to simple majority voting in any fault-tolerant system.
In the presence of a large differences among version reliabilities, the version with the best reliability
will perform better than any of the fault-tolerant techniques. Consensus Recovery Block produces the
highest reliability most of the time. It outperforms N-version programming, but also very
successfully competes with Recovery Block in situations where the acceptance test is not of the
highest quality. Consensus Recovery Block is surprisingly robust even in the presence of failure
correlation. Acceptance Voting is, under special circumstances, more reliable than both Consensus
Recovery Block and Recovery Block. It, in general, has lower reliability than the others.
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Appendix I
To select subsets of N-tuples which have certain properties such as approximately equal reliabilities
we use the following approach.
We fast select acceptance test versions (forexample, one low reliability, one medium and one high
reliability acceptance test). These versions are then removed from the pool of 20 versions. Also
removed from the pool might be versions which have either very low or very high reliability to better
balance reliabilities of the selected N-tuples. For a given N the remainder of the versions are then
randomly sampled until an N-tuple is formed, one version at the time, which has not already been
accepted for the subset. The average N-tuple reliability is then computed, and if it lies within the
desired reliability range the N-tuple becomes a member the subset. Once the subset contains either all
possible combinations, or at least 600 N-tuples (whichever comes fast), the subset is sorted by
N-tuple reliability and standard deviation of the N-tuple reliability. If a single reliability category was
used (e.g. between 0.8 and 0.9) then the first 30 versions with the smallest N-tuple standard
deviation are chosen and run in the experiment. If a range of reliabilities is desired, the range is
divided into into categories in such a way that members of the same category have identical fast two
digits after the decimal point. Then from each category we chose the combination that has the
smallest standard deviation of the N-tuple reliability.
We have thus chosen a number of subsets. The following are mentioned in the text
N-Tuple Subset A (5 version systems, 5-tuple reliability in the range 0.8 to 0.9, acceptance test
reliabilities of 0.67 (version 20), 0.93 (version 2) and 0.996 (version 18). Version 10 was not used
(too reliable).
N-Tuple Subset B (3 version systems, 3-tuple reliability in the range 0.5 to 1.0, acceptance test
reliabilities of 0.67 (version 20), 0.87 (version 3) and 0.90 (version 17). Version 10 was used.
N-Tuple Subsets C and D were chosen in a manner similar to set B except that they consisted of 5-
and 7-tuples, respectively.
